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The Twentieth Century can be charac- 
terized for Russia as a period of mass 
migration of its citizens. This process is 
connected with economic and political 
factors. A search for a better life took 
place at the beginning of the century 
because the national and religious feel- 
ings of some nationalities had been 
abused (namely Jews and Duhobortsi), 
and also because of economic factors. 
The western regions of the country 
were overpopulated and this situation 
also encouraged Russian migration. 
After the revolution of 1917 and the 
Civil war, millions of participants and 
representatives of the White move- 
ment had to leave their homes because 
they were defeated. But the events of 
World War I1 were far more serious in 
the sense of testing the nation's ability 
to survive. The Soviet Union lost 28 
million people, a large part of them 
were civilians. The theory of the race 
superiority that dominated in fascist 
Germany encouraged the physical 
elimination or reduction of the popu- 
lation of the captured countries. The 
situation was tragic in Russia because 
Stalin's leadership was mostly con- 
cerned with how to save the material 
wealth, and human lives meant noth- 
ing to them. 
The priority in the evacuation was 
given to the equipment of the plants 
rather than to refugees. The military 
doctrine of the Soviet Union suggested 
that the war actions would take place 
on the enemy's territory only, and this 
made it impossible even at the begin- 
ning of the war to create plans for the 
mass evacuation of the population of 
the country. German troops were deci- 
sively attacking and moving into the 
depth of the country in the Summer 
and Autumn of 1941.-The people were 
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caught in a total panic. The civil popu- 
lation suffered most of all and this situ- 
ation created flows of refugees in the 
country. 
The Soviet mass media had created 
a particular image of a German soldier, 
and pictured him as a machine-like 
killer. The flyers and the newspapers 
were full of descriptions of how chil- 
dren had been killed for entertainment 
by the German soldiers, how old 
women had been raped by them, and 
how historical sites of Russia had been 
destroyed. As soon as the front line ap- 
proached, the citizens started to move 
east on their own. The population in 
the rural areas created so-called forest 
settlements. As arule, they moved into 
difficult to reach places in the woods, 
five to seven kilometers away from 
their homes. In the depths of the woods 
they built earth shelters and settled 
there. They hid in the woods until the 
circumstances regarding German or- 
der in the occupied territories was 
clarified. 
The only category of the population 
of Russia that remained under the con- 
trol of the Soviet state was Communist 
and government servants. Those who 
were considered valuable were evacu- 
ated, even by plane, and the rest were 
devolved to guerilla detachments. Ac- 
cording to the survey of the People's 
Commissariat of Home affairs, Com- 
munist Party members and those who 
sympathized with them feared Ger- 
man punishment and that was why 
they hid in the forest. They were pro- 
vided with food and weapons, but 
many did not how to fight. Very often 
such detachments stopped €0 exist. For 
example, one document reads: "our 
relatives came into the wood and told 
us to leave the woods and to return 
home, because the Germans did not 
practice repression as described in the 
Soviet mass media." 
The losses of the Soviet Army dur- 
ing the first months of the war were 
explained to the population of the 
country by the fact that the traitors in 
the Army had not been completely 
eliminated during the mass repression 
of the Thirties. The leadership of the 
country feared the creation of a "fifth 
column" and they undertook certain 
measures-mass shootings in the pris- 
ons and arrests and deportation of un- 
desirable citizens, including Russian 
Germans who had lived in Russia since 
the 18th century. 
The situation was extremely diffi- 
cult for the population of the occupied 
districts. In August and September of 
1941, all supervisors of the occupied 
areas received the order to notify the 
authorities whether there were refu- 
gees, Jews, suspicious people, and for- 
eigners in the areas supervised by 
them. The order to eliminate all unde- 
sirable elements had been given to the 
punitive detachments. Jews were 
killed either on the spot or gathered in 
ghettos. All refugees were considered 
suspicious and they were arrested. If a 
refugee managed to prove that he or 
she had suffered from Bolsheviks or 
had been related to a German national- 
ity then the Germans used such people 
and treated them favourably. They 
sent them back to their native places 
and provided them with work. Thus 
all Finns, Estonians, wealthy Russian 
peasants, and those who had been 
forcefully moved from their homes 
and settled on Sinjavino Swamps in the 
vicinity of Leningrad in the early Thir- 
ties, were granted the opportunity to 
return to their native places. 
The relations between the German 
occupation administration and the lo- 
cal people were of a mixed character. 
During the first days of the occupation, 
in order to avoid spreading panic 
among the population and refugee 
streams, the Germans abolished taxes, 
dissolved collective farms, and offered 
free distribution of goods from the 
stores. By such measures they tried to 
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 stabilize the situation. But some weeks 
later, they restored the taxes and told the 
citizens that the taxes would be temporary 
until the end of the war. In their mass 
media, the Germans put all the 
responsibility and shame on the Soviet 
communists. For example, one flyer read: 
"It is a pity to look at the refugees who 
have left their homes. The Jewish 
Bolshevik propaganda has made a 
nationwide brainwashing. Thousands of 
women, old people, and children are 
leaving their native places; they fear 
German soldiers who have brought them 
freedom from Stalin's slavery." The name 
of this flyer was" The happy and the 
unhappy." 
The freedom of the population to move 
in Russia was very limited late in 1941 and 
early 1942 after the front line had become 
more or less steady. The situation was 
similar on the both sides; occupied and 
free. In the Soviet zone, the existence of 
people depended completely on the food 
ration. The refugees were mainly used in 
the sphere of production. They were not 
allowed to leave a factory or a plant where 
they worked. The punishment was severe 
imprisonment. Charges were laid for being 
late for work or for missing a day. The 
people who had been deported (like 
Russian-Germans) were used for the most 
difficult work. This category of people 
were regularly checked by the People's 
Commissariat of Home Affairs. In cases 
where they left a place where they had 
been settled without permission, they were 
punished by 10 years of imprisonment in 
the concentration camp. 
On the German side, the so called 
active population, both those who worked 
for Germans and those who fought against 
them, were exposed to maximum danger. 
The guerillas were hunting policemen, 
supervisors, trans 
lators, and clerks who worked for the pro-
German mass-media. If caught they were 
hanged on the road-crossings, and their 
bodies were mined. The Germans tried to 
save their associates 
and they moved them to big cities that 
were reliably protected. From 1943, the 
Germans started sending them to the 
Baltic and to Germany. II 
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